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The 1996 Conference of 
the Canadian Bioethics Society: 
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by 
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Dr. McQueen is a Sessional Lecturer in Christian Elhics althe Faculty 
a/Theology, University a/St. Michael's College, Toronto, with special 
interests in medical and sexual ethics and the interdisciplinary aspects 
of law, theological ethics and medicine. 
There a/so, Fr. Walsh is Associate Professor of Christian Ethics, 
teaching Fundamental Chris/ian Ethics and Medical Ethics. 
In their introduction to Catholic Perspectives on Medkal 
Morals, the editors, Pellegrino, Langan and Harvey, point out that until 
recently Catholic medical morals had the field to itself. In the last 
twenty·five years or so, however, biomedical ethics has become the 
domain of secular philosophers. The current methodology is 
characterized as strongly utilitarian, pragmatic and eclectic, and as more 
attractive than theological ethics to a secular, pluralistic society. I The 
writers are speaking about the situation in the United States, but they 
could be speaking equally well about Canada. 
The focus of this article is the absence at the conference of any 
public reference to the transcendent in human experience and the 
consequences of this for public debate. It is a personal reaction and 
must, therefore, be subjective and reflect only a part of what was there 
to be sampled. It is not concerned with the caliber of what, in some 
cases, passed for philosophy or ethics. Indeed, the vast majority of the 
46 Linacre Quarterly 
participants seemed professionally sound and genuinely interested in 
pursuing the truth . Neither is it a subtle attack on anyone's personal 
beliefs or practices. This article intends to question the faith which 
denies faith yet supplies its own faith answer, namely the faith which 
asserts that there is no God. It intends also to explore the morality of 
compromise. It is important to have dialogue with non-Christians in 
the hope that practical solutions are in confonnity with Christian 
morality even if the context is devoid of ultimate concern. 
It is not at all the case that the Society is against religious 
persons. The out going president is a Roman Catholic religious sister 
and the 1996-7 president is a Roman Catholic also. There are several 
Roman Catholics and practicing Christians of other denominations who 
are very influentia1 in the organization. The question before us is how 
Christians should be light to the pluralistic world ofbioethics.2 
Aspects of this question date from the dawn of Christianity and 
have been part of its history ever since.) The 1970s saw a widespread 
debate among Roman Catholic theologians about the specificity of 
Christian ethics. How does faith influence morality? Are there 
answers to moral dilemmas which are opaque to human reason without 
the aid of faith? Is the work of faith restricted to intentiona1ity and 
motivation alone? Is there a true possibility of conversation with non-
Christians? 
The Roman Catholic tradition is strong on the ability of human 
reason unaided by faith to anive at right moral judgments. Presumably. 
this refers to a potentia1 whose possibility for actualization depends on 
many factors , both agent specific and cultural. Further, it has more 
immediate reference to general attitudes than to specific judgments of 
conscience. In a culture where spiritual values are appreciated and 
where human persons are understood in their relationship to the 
transcendent, human reason has a horizon of truth. Where Christian 
anthropology is denied or disregarded, where pluralism in ethics is 
lauded as a great value, where religious views are estimated as purely 
subjective. idiosyncratic or ideological, then unaided human reason is 
out of its depth. 
What was very heartening at the conference was the strong 
movement away from the medicalization of ethics (every ethical 
problem is really a medical question) to the promotion of the dignity of 
the human person to the core of all health care questions and as the 
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essential element in the how and what of their answers. Immediately, 
however, the question arises as to the adequacy of the notion of 
personal dignity which is without any consideration of the religious 
nature of the human person and his or her relationship with what 
transcends human life, love and relationships. The concern is not that 
a secular appreciation of the human person is short of a fuller 
appreciation of the person which comes from revelation, as if religious 
folk know an added dimension of the person which is already adequate 
in secular thought. It is .that we are dealing with distortion, even though 
this is not necessarily recognized by either group, believers or non-
believers, especially when the groups genuinely want to work together 
for the good of all. 
"Dignity" is a fonnal concept which does not have content until 
that content is spelled out. Until we know what is involved in the 
concept "dignity of the human person", we do not know which actions 
are demanded (by justice and by love) and which are excluded with 
respect to any human person. The "death with dignity" slogan can 
serve to make the point, where both sides on the assisted suicide debate 
use the concept of dignity to promote or decry euthanasia. Other 
examples of this were very evident at the conference. Tenns like 
autonomy, dignity, futility, family, justice, the common good and 
compassion were interpreted very differently by speakers. It is not too 
difficult to see, for example, how a notion of the human person as the 
measure of all things and as being in a relationship with other humans 
according to a liberal individualistic model would necessarily support 
the morality of assisted suicide. 
Classically, theology is understood as faith seeking 
understanding. When moral theology is defined as reason infonned by 
faith, there has been a subtle change which can result, if we are not 
careful, in a demotion of faith's role . The role of faith in our culture is 
absolutely crucial. Without a unifying faith, and here we are speaking 
about any faith which accepts the dependence of human beings on God 
and their eternal destiny, concepts of what it means to be human in our 
culture have become diverse and contradictory. 
Would it not be possible to achieve a sufficient common ground 
with a recovery of "habits of the heart" (virtues) without a religious 
faith? It WOUld, if this were possible in our culture. The truth is that 
virtues are acquired abilities and these require content too. Being 
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loving and compassionate is not reducible to wann feelings, nor can 
virtues be given common content through naked intuition or a moral 
sense. But, it might be countered, are we not in agreement about 
practical matters anyhow, even if our theoretical bases are different? 
The fact is, often we are not. For example, we differ with respect to 
allocation questions, the use of fetal tissue, abortion, euthanasia, 
withdrawal of life support systems, confidentiality ... the list goes on. 
But surely these questions are debated between religious bioethicists 
themselves? True, but at least here there can be an appeal to a common 
ground from which practical answers should flow. There is no 
common ground between the various fOl1lls of atheistic philosophy and 
religious belief. 
What is the bioethicist to do who is committed to a religious 
stance? 
I) A first step would be to make one's faith stance known, and 
known for what it is. It is not an individual preference like being a fan 
a particular sports team, or being fond of bran muffins. It is a total 
person-determining commitment which influences one's every moral 
position. 
2) Persons dedicated to religious faith should recognize that the 
denial or disregard for the transcendent is a faith stance, too, and should 
not be accorded the high ground it claims. Religious bioethicists 
should not be cowed, somehow, into keeping faith truths out of the 
conversation or feeling that what they have to say in this way is of no 
importance to a dialogue between professionals. In the name of 
friendship, humility or fear of elitism, neither should they be afraid of 
their own specifically faith commitment to truth and its consequences 
for a horizon of meaning and what flows from thi s. 
3) Persons of religious faith should be aware that when religious 
bioethicists and secular bioethicists talk together in a realm without 
consideration of the transcendent, they are not necessarily, as is often 
understood, conversing on common ground. For the person of faith, 
there is an understanding that the human person is open to the 
transcendent, even if that is not being discussed directly in the present 
conversation. In the same conversation, the one without faith in the 
transcendent has a different understanding of the human person. 
4) It is important, for the good of people, that right decisions are 
made in health care both at policy levels and in individual cases. 
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Religious bioethicists should continue to search for the truth in 
common with others, with those of similar beliefs and with those of 
none. They should continue to influence others after the manner of 
Pope John Paul U's encyclical. Evangelium Vitae, calling people beyond 
their present understanding in accordance with their deepest and truest 
appreciations (see pars. 2 and 30). A religious person's commitment to 
letting his or her faith provide the horizon of truth for ethical judgment 
need not be expressed in talk about God nor in specifically religious 
language.4 
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